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I. INTRODUCTION 
This litigation arises out of an ill-considered decision by Plaintiff? Appellant/Cross-
Appellee Kootenai Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("KBC") to reconfigure its high voltage power line 
adjacent to Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant Lamar Corporation's ("Lamar") billboard 
and catwalk, adding a second set of higher lines, and moving one of the sets of lines to within 
eight feet of the billboard - all without telling Lamar. Unaware of the extremely dangerous 
condition KBC had created, Lamar hired James Kuntz to replace the covering on the billboard, as 
he had several times before. Kuntz was also unaware of KBC's highly dangerous 
reconfiguration and came into contact with the overhead line while working on the catwalk, 
suffering serious injuries. 
In the ensuing federal action filed by Kuntz against KBC and Lamar, KBC asserted in a 
cross-claim and affirmative defense that Kuntz's contact with a high voltage wire resulted from 
both Kuntz's and Lamar's breaches of their duties to KBC under Idaho's High Voltage Act 
("HV A") (I.C. § 55-2403) (I 992)' to notify KBC of work to be performed within ten feet of a 
high voltage line. Lamar and Kuntz defended by countering that KBC had failed to notify them 
of the dangerous condition it had created when it reconfigured its line. 
KBC obtained a summary judgment of liability on its claims against Lamar and Kuntz in 
the federal action. Both in its pleadings and in its requested jury instrnctions, KBC sought an 
apportionment of fault and damages, but, significantly, denied that it had any indemnity claim 
' The 1992 version of the HVA applicable to the 1998 events at issue is identical to the current 
statute for purposes of this appeal. A copy of the 1992 HVA, along with other cited statutes and 
mies, is set forth in the attached Appendix ("Apx."). 
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against Lamar. To KEC' s apparent surprise, the federal jury allocated 50% of the fault for 
Kuntz' injuries to KEC, and only 38% to Lamar, and 12% to Plaintiff Kuntz. The federal court 
reduced the Plaintiffs' total damages by 12% and then entered judgment against KEC in the 
amount of $9,965,752.00 (50% of the reduced damage award), and against Lamar in the amount 
of$7,573,971.50 (38% of the reduced damage award). 
After the entry of the $9 .9 million judgment against it, KEC filed a post-trial motion to 
alter or amend the judgment in which it claimed, for the first time, that it had a right of 
"indemnity" or "reimbursement" against Lamar under Idaho's HVA. The federal court 
concluded that KEC had waived its claim to indemnity and denied the motion. Lamar satisfied 
the judgment against it. KEC appealed the judgment against it, which was affirmed by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
KEC, essentially, re-filed its post-trial motion to reallocate as a new Complaint in Idaho 
state court seeking reimbursement from Lamar for the $9.9 million it had to pay on the federal 
judgment. District Judge John R. Luster properly concluded that the Idaho Complaint was 
barred by the res judicata effect of the federal judgment. 
In its appeal to this Court, KEC inconsistently argues that res judicata: I) applies to the 
parts of the final, apportioned judgment in the prior federal action that benefit it - i.e., the 
pmtions of the prior federal summary judgment establishing that Lamar is liable for Kuntz's 
injuries; but 2) does not apply to the apportioned damage part of that judgment, nor to that part 
of the federal court judgment denying its motion to alter or amend the judgment. Two judges -
one in federal comi and one in state court - have properly rejected that argument, holding that 
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KEC cannot deny any indemnity claim and pursue and obtain apportioned damages under 
Idaho's HVA in federal conrt, and then tum around and invoke§ 55-:2404(2) of the HVA in the 
state court to shift its 50% portion of the apportioned judgment to Lamar. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in the First Judicial District ofidaho 
in favor of Lamar, which dismissed the Complaint of KEC on res judicata grounds because the 
cause of action in KEC's Idaho Complaint was previously tried to final judgment in the Federal 
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington (No. CS-00-0415-RHW, ajf'd, Kuntz v. 
Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2004), hereinafter "the Kuntz action"). 
B. The Course of These Proceedings. 
KEC filed this action on December 30, 2002, alleging that Lamar was required to 
indemnify it' for the $9,965,752 judgment entered against KEC in the Kuntz action, as well as 
$300,672.78 in costs and expenses KEC incurred defending the Kuntz action, and that Lamar 
was "precluded" from relitigating its statutory liability under Idaho's HVA, § 55-2401 et seq., 
2 The parties below and on appeal refer to a utility's claim for "damages to third persons," as 
described in I.C. § 55-2404(2), as "indemnity" or "statutory indemnity." Lamar will continue the 
shorthand reference, but it is important to note that KEC does not construe the phrase the same as 
common law indemnity, which is only available when a "person who is without fault is 
compelled to pay damages occasioned by the negligence of another .... " Beitzel v. City of Coeur 
d'Alene, 121 Idaho 709, 717, 827 P.2d 1160, 1168 (1992) (emphasis added). KEC claims that 
"statutory indemnity" under § 2404(2) requires contractors to reimburse KEC for damages 
occasioned by KEC's fault, notwithstanding the rule of common law indemnity that "no one 
should be pennitted to base a cause of action on [that party's] own wrong." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
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"pursuant to the doctrines ofresjudicata and estoppel." (Old R., Vol. I, p. 6, ,r,r 4.4, 4.8-4.10).' 
Lamar's answer asserted, among other defenses, judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, res 
judicata, !aches and, in light of KEC's pending appeal of the federal judgment in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals,' lack ofripeness. (Id., pp. 174-180). 
While KEC's Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, Judge John R. Luster resolved cross-
motions for summary judgment, concluding that he was "constrained to follow" broad language 
in LC. § 55-2404(2) that appeared to allow a utility to be indemnified for its own reckless 
misconduct (including attorney fees), even though "[ t ]he Idaho legislature could not have 
foreseen" the fact pattern presented in this case. (R., Vol. 2, p. 333 ("2003 Order")). Lamar 
appealed the 2003 Order to this Court, which dismissed the appeal, No. 30808, as premature, 
since the 2003 Order also concluded that material fact issues remained as to whether KEC was 
barred by !aches from pursuing its indemnity claim against Lamar. (R., Vol. 1, p. 16). 
Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal judgment against 
KEC (Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2004)), satisfying the "final judgment" 
element of the res judicata defense Lamar asserted in the state court action. Following this 
' In its Opening Brief, KEC refers to the Clerk's Record on Appeal in the earlier appeal before 
this Court (No. 30808) as "R. 30808" and the additional Record on Appeal for this appeal (No .. 
33807) as "R. 33807." See, e.g., Appt.'s Br., p. 9. Because the case numbers are similar, and in 
an attempt to avoid undue confusion, Lamar will refer to documents in the earlier record (Appeal 
No. 30808) as "Old R." and documents in the additional record (Appeal No. 33807) as "R." To 
further avoid confusion, Lamar will designate volumes in the old record by Roman numerals (I, 
II, III, an IV) and volumes in the additional record by arabic numerals (1, 2, 3, and 4). 
4 Lamar had already satisfied the judgment against it and was not a party to KEC's appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit. See 385 F.3d at I 181 n.5. 
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Court's remand to the Trial Court, Lamar filed a motion for summary judgment based on its res 
judicata defense. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 237-263). The renewed motion also argued that KEC's 
Complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Id.) 
The Trial Court concluded that KEC's Complaint was not untimely, but was barred by 
res judicata and dismissed the action. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 837-862). KEC filed this appeal on 
December 11, 2006 and Lamar filed a cross-appeal on December 26, 2006 (id., pp. 864, 873). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The critical facts are those established in the Kuntz action, including: 1) KEC's role as a 
plaintiff in asserting its affirmative claim alleging Kuntz's and Lamar's violation of Idaho's 
HVA; 2) the federal jury's apportionment of fault and damages based on KEC's pleading and 
successful motion for partial summary judgment on its affirmative claim; and 3) the federal 
judge's denial ofKEC's post-trial motion for statutory indemnity against Lamar, under LC. § 55-
2404(2). 
1. The federal jury correctly concluded that KEC's "reckless" 
misconduct was a 50% causal factor of James Kuntz's injuries. 
KEC's attempt to rehabilitate its role in Km1tz's 1998 accident (Appt.'s Br., pp. 17-21) is 
both irrelevant to the issues before this Court and unavailing. The Ninth Circuit summarized the 
evidence supporting the federal jury's conclusion that KEC engaged in reckless misconduct as 
follows: 
About one year before the accident, [KEC] reconstructed the Chilco line, 
changing from 40-foot poles with one cross-arm and three conductors, to 50-foot 
poles with two cross-arms and six conductors. After the reconstruction project 
was completed, the conductor nearest to the billboard was eight feet from the 
billboard.[] [KEC] did not warn Lamar or Kuntz that a conductor was closer to 
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the billboard than before the reconstruction, and undertook no protective 
measurers. 
* * * 
The Idaho courts have emphasized that the key to the meaning of reckless or 
willful conduct is knowledge, thus implying an element of foreseeability. . .. 
Therefore, with regard to the willful and reckless nature of [KBC's] conduct, the 
relevant question is ... whether moving this high voltage line and maintaining it 
within eight feet of the billboard involved a high probability that harm would 
result. 
We agree with the district court that there was sufficient evidence to create a jury 
question on the issue of willful or reckless conduct. It is undisputed that an 
electric utility is held to the highest degree of care. [KBC] moved its lines closer 
to the billboard without warning. Expert evidence indicated that a ten-foot 
clearance provided the highest degree of safety, and that [KBC] had a policy of 
observing that standard in other instances. There was also evidence of [KBC's] 
prior dealings with other billboard owners whose structures were within ten feet 
of its lines .... The evidence also indicated that [KBC's ] engineers knew that 
there was a billboard within close proximity of the new lines, that the billboard 
had a catwalk, and that the billboard was changed periodically. 
Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., supra, 385 F.3d at 1180, 1186 (footnote omitted). KBC's proven 
awareness "of a particularized danger, and the ability to protect against it," fully supported the 
jury allocation of 50% of the fault to KBC. Id. at 1186, n.9. It was KBC - not Lamar and not 
Kuntz - that created the exceedingly dangerous condition. Even though KBC knew of both the 
dangerous proximity of the new lines to a billboard with a catwalk, "and that the billboard was 
changed periodically," it failed to either warn Lamar or Kuntz of the dangerously close line or 
take protective measures. Id. at 1180, 1186. 
Based on the ample evidence supporting the jury's verdict, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
$9,965,752.00judgmentagainstKBC. Id. at 1181, 1187. 
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2. The federal jury's apportioned verdict in the Kuntz action 
resolved the cause of action that KEC asserted against Lamar 
and Kuntz under Idaho's HV A. 
KEC incorrectly states at pages 38 and 42 of its Brief that it "did not plead" and "did not 
assert" any "right to recovery pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-2404(2) in the prior federal action." 
It did both. It pled some of the damages available under § 2404(2) of Idaho's HVA for its 
statutory cause of action against Lamar, and asserted additional damages available under 
§ 2404(2) - "damages to third persons" - in a post-trial motion. 
First, KEC's own state court Complaint stated that KEC had pied a cause of action under 
LC. § 55-2401 et seq. (Idaho's HVA) against Lamar in the Kuntz action. (Comp!., R. Vol. 4, p. 
762, ,r 3.3; see also R. Vol. 2, pp. 329-330, 331). Damages available for the cause of action KEC 
pled are set forth in § 55-2404(2): "all damages to the facilities and all costs and expenses, 
including damages to third persons, incurred by the public utility .... " (Apx. at A-4). KEC did 
not plead "damages to the facilities" in the answer and cross-claim it filed in the Kuntz action, 
but it did demand certain incurred "costs and expenses" - i.e., "reasonable attorney's fees 
allowed by law." (R. Vol. 2, p. 331). Its answer and cross-claim did not seek "damages to third 
persons" (indemnity), but did seek the inconsistent remedy of an apportionment of fault among 
"all parties to this litigation." (Id.) 
Second, KEC obtained summary judgment on the liability portion of its HV A cause of 
action against Lamar and Kuntz in the Kuntz action. Judge Whaley agreed with KEC's 
arguments that: 1) Idaho Jaw and Idaho's HVA applied; 2) Lamar and Kuntz were both 
"contractors" as defined in Idaho's HVA; 3) LC. § 55-2403 imposes a specific, nondelegable 
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duty upon contractors to give utilities prior written notice of work being done within ten feet of a 
high voltage line; 4) Lamar and Kuntz each violated § 55-2403; 5) those statutory violations 
rendered Lamar and Kuntz "negligent per se"; and 6) Lamar's and Kuntz's negligence each 
proximately caused Kuntz's contact with a high voltage wire and resulting injuries and damages. 
(R., Vol. 2, pp. 333, 336-337, 340,342, 358.) 
Third, based on KEC's partial summary judgment, the federal court in the Kuntz action 
"directed the jury to enter a judgment against Lamar and Kuntz both on the question of 
negligence and proximate cause." Appellant's Brief("Appt.'s Br."), p. 8 (emphasis added). See 
also pre-answered verdict forms at R., Vol. 2, pp. 360-361. 
Fourth, as requested by KEC, the federal court provided separate verdict forms and 
directed the jury to "apportion damages" (Appt.'s Br., p. 8) (emphasis added), consistent with 
KEC's pleadings. Having failed to offer any evidence of costs or attorneys' fees incurred in 
investigating the accident and preparing its defense, KEC sought no instruction for any such 
damages. Further, at the jury instruction conference, KEC stated that it had no indemnity claim 
against Lamar: 
[A]t the conclusion of the jury instruction conference, this Court asked both 
Lamar and KEC whether either thought it had an indemnity claim against the 
other. Both replied "no," with which the Court agreed, noting that neither of the 
Defendants had submitted a jury instruction to that effect. 
(Old. R., Vol. II, p. 452). 
Fifth, after the federal court entered judgment on the jmy' s apportioned verdict, KEC 
claimed for the first time to be entitled to "indemnity" from Lamar under§ 2404(2) of Idaho's 
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HV A. Specifically, KBC filed a motion "to alter or amend" the judgment to include an order 
requiring Lamar to "indemnify" KBC's $9,965,752.00 judgment-precisely the same relief KBC 
seeks in this case. (Old R., Vol. II, pp. 450-669, 473-477). 
In support of its post-trial motion, KEC's counsel argued that KBC had pied and litigated 
a cause of action under LC. § 55-2401 et seq. against Lamar. See Old R., Vol. II, p. 474 ("Now, 
the High Voltage Act was definitely pied, per se. In fact, it was the subject of a number of 
rulings that this Court has already made .... "). In this appeal, KBC is arguing just the contrary. 
See, e.g., Appt. 's Br. at 42. In its post-trial argument, KBC tried to excuse its indemnity waiver 
by alleging that one "element" of indemnity - the "amount of damage" incurred by KBC - was 
not "present" until the jury returned its verdict. (Old R., Vol. II, p. 474). Judge Whaley rejected 
that argument because KBC could and should have pied and tried its claim to indemnity damages 
under § 2404(2) before the jury returned its verdict apportioning fault for Kuntz's injuries: 
If it had been [pied], ... it could have been tried to the jury after their verdict; or it 
could have been tried, if the jury was waived, to the court, or it could have 
theoretically gone to the jury with the plaintiffs' claim. But not having pied it, it's 
not before me unless I find somehow we can amend the pleadings in a post-trial 
context; aud I don't believe we can. 
(Old R., Vol. II, p. 474). 
Consistent with Judge Whaley's ruling, Lamar satisfied the $7.5 million judgment against 
it. Kuntz, supra, 385 F.2d at 1181 n.5. KBC not only failed to appeal Judge Whaley's post-trial 
ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but also affirmatively asserted in its state court 
Complaint that "the findings and rulings of the Honorable Robert H. Whaley are entitled to full 
faith and credit in this court .... " (R., Vol. 4, p. 765, ,r 4.4) (emphasis added). 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL 
A. Lamar's Restatement of KEC's Issue on Appeal: 
Under both claim and issue preclusion, did the entry of the final apportioned judgment on 
KEC's federal court, HV A cross-claim against Lamar, and the federal court's rejection ofKEC's 
post-trial request for "indemnity" under LC. § 55-2404(2), bar KEC from later filing suit against 
Lamar for inde1m1ity under LC. § 55-2404(2)? 
B. Lamar's Additional Issues on Appeal (Cross-Appeal Issues): 
Although technically not necessary, Lamar filed a cross-appeal to raise the following 
additional issues which supply additional grounds for this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. If the Court affinns the trial court's res judicata decision, it need not reach these 
additional issues. 
I. KEC's claims against Lamar, both in the federal court and in this action, were 
statutory dan1age claims created by LC. § 55-2404(2) (" ... the contractor 
committing the violation shall be liable ... for all damages to the facilities and all 
costs and expenses, including damages to third persons, incurred by the public 
utility .... ") (emphasis added). LC.§ 55-2404(2) should be construed consistently 
with Idaho's comparative negligence statute, LC. § 6-801 et seq. so as to give 
meaning to both statutes, and not result in an implied repeal of the comparative 
negligence statute in this case. The jury's finding that KEC's fault (50%) was 
greater than Lamar's (38%) precludes any recovery by KBC under the Idaho 
comparative negligence statute. 
2. LC. § 55-2404(2) should be construed consistently with Idaho's Contribution 
statute, LC. § 6-803(1), which only permits KEC to recover from Lamar if KEC 
"has paid more than [its] pro rata share" of the federal judgment. KBC has not 
paid more. 
3. KEC's statutory claim under LC. § 55-2404(2), which was filed in the Idaho 
District Court more than four years after the accident, is barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations in LC. § 5-218(A) ("an action upon a liability created by 
statute" - in this case, LC. § 55-2401 et seq.). 
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IV. ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
A. Standard of Review and Summary of the Argument. 
Lamar agrees that this Court's review of Judge Luster's decisions is de novo. As part of 
that de novo review, this Court may affirm on any basis supporting summary judgment. 
Consolidated AG of Curry, Inc. v. Rengent, Inc., 128 Idaho 228,231,912 P.2d 115, 118 (1996). 
Contrary to KEC's framing of the issue before this Court, the decision below is not an 
example of "procedure over substance," or "a dismissal based on a technicality." (Appt.'s Br., 
pp. 22, 49). The doctrine of res judicata "is not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited 
from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, 'of 
public policy and of private peace,' which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the 
courts." Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981), quoting Hart Steel 
Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294,299 (1917). Nor is resjudicata a "penumbra! issue" 
in this appeal (Appt.'s Br., p. 22). The proper resolution of KEC's appeal derives from the 
straightforward application of well-established finality principles embodied in the doctrines of 
claim preclusion ("true" resjudicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) . 
.El.!]!, Judge Luster correctly concluded that the "claim" KEC asserts against Lamar in 
this action is the same "claim" it litigated against Lamar to final judgment in the prior federal 
action. The "transaction" that was the subject of the Kuntz action and this action is the same -
James Kuntz's contact with a high voltage wire causing him serious injuries. The cause of action 
KBC asserted against Lamar in the Kuntz action and this action is the same - violation of a duty 
owed to KBC under Idaho's HVA (LC. § 55-2401 et seq.) that resulted in Kuntz's contact with a 
RESPONDENT'S OPPOSING BRIEF AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL-18 
high voltage wire and severe injuries. Even the remedy KEC seeks - indemnity - was litigated 
in the federal court action by KEC's post-trial motion. But even ifit had not been, a party cannot 
bring a second cause of action "to seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first 
action." Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 25. 
Second, KEC not only could and should have, but did litigate its alleged indemnity right 
under § 2404(2) in the Kuntz action. KEC's attempt to relitigate its right to additional damages 
is therefore precluded by issue preclusion as well as claim preclusion. The same argument KEC 
makes in this action - that its indemnity claim was "not ripe" and "did not accrue" until the jury 
returned its apportioned verdict - was offered (and rejected) in post-trial proceedings in the 
Kuntz action. KEC did not appeal Judge Whaley's ruling and is bound by that decision. 
Third, KEC's proposed "pennissive cross-claim" exception to res judicata would only 
be relevant if KEC had not filed a cross-claim for affirmative relief under Idaho's HVA in the 
Kuntz action. Having filed a substantive cross-claim, KEC was required to bring all its theories 
and all its damage claims in that case. It cannot raise some and reserve others for a second action 
in case it loses on the first try. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 151, 804 P.2d 
319, 324 (1990) ("The policy considerations undergirding the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel ... preclude the splitting of a same transactional claim into discrete and 
substantive theories or variant fonns of relief flowing from those theories"). 
In short, having elected to: 1) assert its cause of action under the HVA against Lamar in 
federal court; 2) pursue (and successfully obtain) allocated damages based on the jury's 
apportionment of fault; and 3) not appeal the federal judge's denial of its motion for statutory 
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indemnity under I.C. § 55-2404(2), KEC has no basis for invoking this Court's "compassionate 
eye" (Appt.'s Br., p. 24), and no entitlement to a "second bite" at the damages apple. 
B. Choice of Law. 
The parties and the Trial Court assumed that Idaho law applies to Lamar's res judicata 
defense. That does not, however, limit this Court's de novo review of the correctness of that 
assumption. See Consolidated AG of Curry, Inc. v. Ren gent, Inc., 128 Idaho at 228, 231, 912 
P.2d 115, 118 (1996) ("to uphold a ruling of the trial court, this Court may review theories of the 
case that parties not only fail to raise before the trial court, but also fail to raise on appeal"). 
This Comi has applied federal preclusion principles to federal judgments on certain 
occasions, and state law on others. In Puckett v. City of Emmett, 113 Idaho 639, 747 P.2d 48 
(1988), this Court held that federal principles apply to detennine the preclusive effect of a prior 
judgment issued by a federal district court: 
In section 87, the Restatement [(Second) of Judgments] takes the position based 
on leading commentators in the better reasoned cases, that "Federal law 
determines the effects under the rules of resjudicataofajudgmentofa federal 
court." Thus, our analysis must rest upon a review of federal case law. 
Accord J.Z.G Resources, Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
"federal res judicata principles" apply to a federal judgment based on diversity jurisdiction and 
citing cases from the 1st, 4th, 5th, 10th and 11th Circuits to the same effect). Recently this Court 
applied Idaho rules of claim and issue preclusion (without discussion) to federal judgments in 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007) (claim preclusion) and Blome v. 
Truska, 130 Idaho 6690, 946 P.2d 631 (1997) (issue preclusion). 
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In either event, this appeal presents no "conflict" between the law applied by federal and 
Idaho courts - both follow the basic principles of Sections 24 and 25 ( claim preclusion) and 
Sections 27 and 28 (issue preclusion) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.' Further, this 
Court has frequently followed U.S. Supreme Court authority in addressing res judicata.6 Given 
this Court's precedents and the strong federal interests in enforcing the preclusive effects of 
federal judgments, Lamar will include an analysis of federal claim and issue preclusion in its 
argument. 
C. KEC's State Court Action Is Barred by Claim Preclusion. 
The elements of claim preclusion ("true" res judicata) are: "!) same parties; 2) same 
claims; and 3) final judgment." Ticor Title, supra, 157 P.3d at 618; Havercombe v. Dept. of 
Educ. of Com. of P.R., 250 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001). KEC concedes the first and third elements, 
but contends that its "claim for indemnity" in this case is not the "same claim" as its "claim for 
apportionment" in the prior action. (Appt. 's Br., pp. 26-27, 42). 
5 See, e.g., Ticor, supra, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.2d 613, 625 (2007) (applying the "transactional" 
approach to claim preclusion in § 24); 18 Wright-Miller-Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc., § 4407, p. 
169 (the Restatement's transactional formulation of "claim" has been adopted in decisions 
"representing virtually all federal courts, as to be the predominant federal rule"); Farrell v. 
Brown, Ill Idaho 1027, 1030, 729 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1986) (applying the Restatement 
formulation of issue preclusion); Rabi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(same). 
6 See, e.g., Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 485-486, 65 P.3d 502, 507-508 (2003) (citing 
Underwriters Nat 'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guaranty 
Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691,710 (1982) with approval); H.S. Cramer & Co., Inc. v. Washburn-Wilson 
Seed Co., 71 Idaho 421, 434, 233 P.2d 809, 818 (1951) (adopting the holding of American Surety 
Co. of New York v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932) and Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 
U.S. 470,479 (1930)). 
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KEC's argument fails on two grounds. First, Idaho and federal law apply a transactional 
approach to define a "claim," and both the Kuntz action and this action arise out of the same 
transaction or event - Kuntz's contact with a high voltage wire causing him serious injuries. 
While KEC now claims that it is entitled to indenmity in addition to the apportionment of 
damages it requested and received in the Kuntz action, it is well established that res judicata 
extinguishes all rights to remedies arising out of a transaction.' 
Second, even if a "claim for indenmity'' were a separate and distinct "claim" (as KEC 
contends), KEC litigated that "claim" in post-trial proceedings before the federal judge in the 
Kuntz action. Judge Whaley's unappealed denial ofKEC's request for relief under§ 2404(2) is 
final and binding. 
7 Under earlier Idaho jurisprudence, KEC would have made a binding election of remedies when 
it elected to litigate apportioned fault and damages in the Kuntz action, precluding it from 
subsequently pursuing "fault free" statutory indenmity after judgment was entered on the 
apportioned verdict. See, e.g., Keesee v. Fetzek, 106 Idaho 507, 509-511, 681 P.2d 600, 602-604 
(Idaho App. 1984) (a binding election of remedies occurs when "the remedies available actually 
. . . conflict with each other" and plaintiff has "taken some decisive act indicating an intent to 
pursue a particular remedy") ( citations omitted). Keesee further notes, however, that claim 
preclusion serves the purposes of the doctrine in modern practice. Id. Accord Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments, § 25, Comment f (because "[i]n a modern system of procedure it is 
ordinarily open to the plaintiff to pursue in one action all of the possible remedies whether or not 
consistent, whether alternative or cumulative, and whether of the types historically called legal or 
equitable," it is "fair" to preclude the plaintiff, following a judgment, "from seeking any other 
remedies deriving from the same grouping of facts"). 
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1. The judgment entered on KEC's cross-claim against Lamar in 
the Kuntz action extinguished all rights to remedies KEC had 
against Lamar with respect to Kuntz's contact with a high 
voltage wire. 
Because the "claim" extinguished by a final judgment includes "all rights ... to remedies" 
with respect to the underlying transaction. (Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 258-259, 668 P.2d 
130, 134-135 (1983) quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments,§ 24(1)), a court analyzing the 
second prong of claim preclusion must first determine the "transaction" litigated in the first case. 
A "transaction" is a "factual grouping" which, when considered "pragmatically," "form[ s] a 
convenient trial unit." Ticor, supra, 157 P.2d at 620; Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 
§ 24(2). See also Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 69, 878 P.2d 762, 768 (1994) 
("Given that the underlying operative facts are the same for both cases, all claims that could have 
been brought in the first action are now barred"); Hagee v. City of Evanston, 729 F.2d 510, 513 
n.5 (7th Cir. 1984) ("a court employing a transactional approach will focus ... on the factual 
setting in which each suit arises"). 
Here, the factual setting of the Kuntz action was: 1) KEC's decision to reconfigure its 
Chilco line; 2) KEC's failure to advise Lamar or Kuntz of the reconfigured line'.s dangerously 
close proximity to a billboard owned by Lamar; 3) Kuntz's and Lamar's failure to notify KEC of 
Kuntz's intent to work within ten feet of a high voltage wire; and 4) Kuntz's contact with a high 
voltage wire, resulting in serious injuries. It is undisputed that that factual grouping/transaction 
was litigated by KBC in the Kuntz action. See, e.g., Old R., Vol. II, p. 474; R., Vol. 4, pp. 762-
763. It is equally undisputed that that is the "same claim" that forms the basis of this suit. See 
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R., Vol. 4, pp. 759-766. "All" ofKEC's "rights to ... remedies" arising out of that transaction 
are therefore merged into the federal judgment. 
KEC seeks to escape this plain and inescapable law by characterizing its single "claim" 
as a bifurcated "apportionment claim" and "indemnity claim." More specifically, KEC claims 
that it "asserted and adjudicated" a "cross-claim for apportionment" in the Kuntz action and "did 
not assert a cross-claim against Lamar for recovery under Idaho Code § 55-2404(2)" until it filed 
this action in state court. (Appt.'s Br., p. 42). Such efforts must fail, for at least two reasons. 
First, a cross-claim is not even necessary merely to obtain an apportionment of fault 
under Idaho's comparative fault statutes. See I.C. § 6-801, § 6-802 (Apx. at A-6, A-7) 
( establishing the effect of contributory negligence in diminishing a damage award and clarifying 
that the doctrine does not "create any new legal theory, cause of action, or legal defense"). 
Second, LC. § 55-2404(2) is not a "claim," or even a cause of action. It is simply part of 
the section describing the damages a utility may seek to recover when it asserts a claim under 
Idaho's HVA. (Apx. at A-4). KEC did not assert any damages to its facilities resulting from 
Kuntz's contact with a high wire in the Kuntz action, but did assert two forms of incurred cost 
and expense damages: I) attorneys' fees; and 2) a limitation of KEC's responsibility for 
damages to third persons to those damages caused by KEC's own active misconduct (i.e., an 
allocation of fault under LC. § 6-801). 8 (Old R., Vol. II, p. 331). At trial, KEC offered no 
' It is not difficult to conceive of strategic reasons for KEC's decision to pursue an allocation of 
fault, combined with judgment as a matter of law against Lamar and Kuntz, in lieu of indemnity. 
On the one hand, KEC would have at least had some doubt as to whether the federal court would 
interpret Idaho's HVA as providing "fault free" indemnity in § 55-2404(2). On the other hand, 
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evidence of attorneys' fees, expressly denied any right to indemnity from Lamar (Old R., Vol. II, 
p. 452), and fully litigated the allocation of fault it sought. (R., Vol. 2, p. 362). It could not file a 
new action for additional § 2404(2) damages. See Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 
146,151,804 P.2d 319,324 (1990) ("The policy considerations undergirding the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel ... preclude the splitting of a same transactional claim into 
discrete and substantive theories or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories"). Accord 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 25 ( claim preclusion applies "even though" party is 
prepared to "seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action"); Keesee v. 
Fetzek, supra, 106 Idaho at 510, 681 P .2d at 603 (res judicata "bars successive suits on the same 
claim, regardless of the remedy sought"); HS. Cramer & Co., supra, 71 Idaho at 434, 233 P.2d 
at 818 (a party cannot prosecute a claim "piecemeal" based on its own "failure seasonably to 
pursue the appropriate ... remedy" (citation omitted)); Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480,485, 65 
P.3d 502, 507 (2003) (having had "the opportunity" to litigate post-judgment interest in a prior 
action, plaintiff could not "take advantage of his own failure to raise issues in the proper 
forum"); McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Nor does the fact that 
McClain's subsequent complaint seeks a different remedy for violation of the same primary right 
verdict forms and instructions requiring the jury to enter judgment against Lamar, within the 
context of well-established tort law (apportionment of liability), could be viewed as the best 
avenue for achieving a minimal (or non-existent) adverse verdict that would be "appeal proof." 
The fact that KEC miscalculated the jury's ability to understand the critical importance ofKEC's 
ill-considered decision to reconfigure its lines without informing Lamar of the extremely 
dangerous condition created does not entitle KEC to embark on a new trial strategy in an Idaho 
state comi. 
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create a new cause of action"); Havercombe v. Department of Educ. of Com. of P.R., supra, 250 
F.3d. 1, 7-8 (rejecting argument that plaintiff could file a second action "asking to be further 
reimbursed over and above the jury award he already received"). 
2. Even if "indemnity" could be considered a separate "claim," 
KEC litigated that claim to final judgment in the Kuntz action. 
Even if this Court were to accept KBC's characterization of its damages under Idaho's 
HV A as an "indenmity claim" for purpose of a "same claim" analysis, the result is no different. 
First, KBC waived any such "claim" when it responded to an inquiry from Judge Whaley by 
confirming that it had no indemnity claim against Lamar (Old. R., Vol. II, p. 452). See Robinson 
v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138, 145, 383 P.2d 844, 848 (1963) (party that "voluntarily elected ... to seek 
relief under the theory of rescission rather than damages" had "waived any claim for damages"); 
Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 670, 735 P.2d 974,981 (1987) (insurer 
"waived" right to arbitrate by proceeding with the litigation process and failing to demand 
arbitration until "it appeared that things were not going its way"). Here, KBC proceeded with a 
claim for apportioned fault and damages until the jury apportioned 50% of the fault to KBC. It is 
only when "things were not going its way" (Hansen, supra) that KBC invoked the indemnity 
provisions of§ 2404(2) to reallocate its apportioned judgment to Lamar. 
Second, KBC's own brief concedes that KBC litigated its "indemnity claim" during post-
trial proceedings in the Kuntz action. See Appt.'s Br., p. 13 (emphasis in original): 
After the verdict, KBC filed a post-trial motion for statutory indemnification 
against Lamar, seeking recovery for the damages KBC incurred, including 
damages to third persons (Kuntz). KBC's motion was premised on IDAHO CODE 
§ 55-2404(2), namely that: (1) Lamar violated the High Voltage Act by failing to 
RESPONDENT'S OPPOSING BRIEF AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL- 26 
give notice to KEC of work being performed near its high voltage overhead line; 
(2) subsequently, Kuntz made electrical contact with KEC's high voltage line; and 
(3) KEC incurred damages for which Lamar was statutorily responsible. 
It is equally indisputable that KEC and Lamar briefed and argued KEC's "indemnity claim," 
Judge Whaley rejected it, and KEC did not appeal that ruling. 
In short, whether characterized as a remedy, additional damages, or a separate "indemnity 
claim," KEC's assertion that§ 2404(2) ofidaho's HVA entitles it to shift its apportioned liability 
to Lamar was litigated and rejected in the Kuntz action and cannot be resurrected in state court. 
D. Issue Preclusion, in Addition to Claim Preclusion, Prevents KEC from 
Relitigating: 1) Apportionment, and 2) Damages to Third Persons 
Under§ 55-2404(2). 
Both this Court and federal courts apply the doctrine of issue preclusion that is set forth 
in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27 (1982) as follows: 
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and 
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the 
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether 
on the same or different claim. 
See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred 
Forty-Three Dollars, U.S. Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 222-223, 814 P.2d 952, 954-955 (1991). 9 
In Blome v. Truska, 130 Idaho 669, 946 P.2d 631 (1997), this Court applied issue 
preclusion to dismiss a complaint under facts remarkably similar to those before this Court. The 
9 In Richardson, this Court breaks the definition down into five questions: "(I) Did the party 
against whom the earlier decision is asserted have a full and fair opportnnity to litigate that issue 
in the earlier case? (2) Was the issue decided in the prior litigation identical with the one 
presented in the action in question? (3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior litigation? (4) 
Was there a final judgment on the merits? (5) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
paiiy or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication?" 120 Idaho at 223, 814 P.2d at 955. 
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underlying proceeding in Blome was a medical malpractice action filed in federal district court 
by Ken Marchand against numerous physicians and a hospital (the "Marchand action"). 
Following the close of evidence, two of the defendants (Dr. Truska and the hospital) requested a 
special verdict form asking the jury to provide an "advisory" allocation of fault among the 
medical defendants. 130 Idaho at 672, 946 P .2d at 634. Other defendants (including Dr. Blome) 
objected to the form, but their objections were overruled. Id. The federal jury proceeded to 
allocate fault among the defendants and an apportioned judgment was entered. 130 Idaho at 671, 
672 P.2d at 633. 
Dr. Blome then invoked Idaho's contribution statute to file a new lawsuit against Dr. 
Truska in Idaho state court, "alleging that he had paid more than his pro-rata share of the 
Marchand verdict in the federal case and seeking contribution from Truska in an amount to be 
determined at t1ial." 130 Idaho at 671, 946 P.2d at 633. Dr. Truska moved for summary 
judgment based on collateral estoppel, which the trial court denied. Id. This Court accepted 
jurisdiction and reversed. 
First, this Court held that the apportioned verdict form was both proper and binding, 
notwithstanding its "advisory" label. 130 Idaho at 672-673, 946 P.2d at 634-635. Second, this 
Court concluded that Dr. Blome was estopped from attacking the apportioned judgment in a new 
proceeding: 
No cross-claims were filed in Marchand, and the co-defendants were limited to 
some extent in their presentation of evidence against co-defendants. 
Consequently, Blome argues that it would be unfair to hold them to the 
apportionment of fault assigned on the special verdict form. However, the record 
shows that the parties were highly cognizant of the possibility that the jury would 
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apportion fault. The defendants raised co-defendant liability as an affirmative 
defense. Truska and another defendant requested apportionment. The parties 
briefed and argued the issue. Blome could not be surprised that the jury was 
instructed to apportion fault. If Blome was frustrated in the presentation of his 
case by the ruling limiting presentation of evidence against a co-defendant, the 
appropriate course of action was to appeal that ruling in the federal system, not 
to bring a separate action for reapportionment in the state system. 
130 Idaho at 674,946 P.2d at 636 (emphasis added). 
The facts of this case are more compelling for dismissal than those in Blome. Whereas 
"[n]o cross-claims" were filed in the prior action in Blome, KEC and Lamar filed cross-claims 
against each other in the Kuntz action. (R., Vol. 2, p. 329; Old R., Vol. III, p. 568). Whereas the 
co-defendants in the prior action in Blome were "limited to some extent in their presentation of 
evidence against co-defendants," there was no such limitation on KEC's presentation of evidence 
against Lamar and Kuntz in the Kuntz action. Certainly KEC was "highly cognizant of the 
possibility that the jury would apportion fault," since it requested apportionment among all three 
parties in its answer and cross-claim, and sought jury instructions and verdict forms consistent 
with apportionment. 
It is equally clear that KEC had a full opportunity to assert and litigate indemnity had it 
wished to do so. Judge Luster used language that closely tracks Blome when he held that: 
KEC clearly had notice of the claim by Kuntz against KEC and Lamar under the 
Idaho HVA. KEC also should have been aware that Kuntz's claim might lead to 
an award against it and that such an award could be indemnified under certain 
provisions in the Idaho HVA. KEC had an opportunity to institute a Cross-Claim 
against Lamar and, in fact, a Cross-Claim was filed. The Cross-Claim did not 
specifically mention indemnification, however. Therefore, it can be inferred from 
the undisputed facts that K.EC had notice of its potential liability and an 
opportunity to make a claim for indemnity against Lamar. 
(Old R., Vol. II, p. 531). 
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Finally, in the prior action in Blome, Dr. Blome did not file a post-trial motion asking the 
judge to "reallocate" his apportioned judgment to reflect Dr. Blome's pro rata share. KEC, 
however, did file a post-trial motion in the Kuntz action asking the federal judge to reallocate its 
judgment to Lamar under § 2404(2). (See Appt.'s Br., p. 13). Here, KEC is not only seeking a 
remedy inconsistent with the apportioned verdict in the Kuntz action, but is asking this Court to 
overturn the Kuntz judge's specific ruling that KEC waived any right to the inconsistent remedy 
of indemnity. If KEC felt that the federal judge in Kuntz was incorrect in denying its post-trial 
motion, "the appropriate course of action was to appeal that ruling in the federal system, not to 
bring a separate action for reapportiomnent in the state system." Blome, 130 Idaho at 674, 946 
P.2d at 636. 
Having actually and necessarily litigated to final judgment both: I) the issue of each 
party's apportioned responsibility for Kuntz's damages; and 2) the issue of whether KEC is 
entitled to reallocate its apportioned judgment to KEC under§ 2404(2) of Idaho's HY A, KEC is 
precluded ( collaterally estopped) from relitigating either issue in a new proceeding in Idaho state 
court. 
E. KEC's Other Arguments Are Also Without Merit. 
KEC' s appeal makes two additional arguments in support of reversal: 1) its "indemnity 
claim" was "unripe" and "premature," and had "not accrued" until the jury returned its 
apportioned verdict in the Kuntz action; and 2) res judicata should not apply to the Kuntz action 
because KEC had alleged its cause of action against Lamar in a "permissive" cross-claim. 
Neither of these arguments supports reversal. 
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1. KEC could and should have litigated all damages and remedies 
available to it under Idaho's HV A in the Kuntz action. 
KEC's argument at pages 28-32 of Appellant's Brief variously asserts that its "indemnity 
claim" was premature, unripe, unavailable, or had not accrued until the "fact" of its own liability 
for Kuntz's injuries was established by the jury's apportioned verdict. The obvious answer to 
that argument is that after the judgment was entered on the jury's verdict in the Kuntz action, 
KBC asserted its indemnity claim in a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the federal 
court denied. KBC never appealed from that denial. Therefore, there is a final judgment from 
the federal district court, entered after the jury established the "fact" ofKBC's liability, that KBC 
is not entitled to indemnity from Lamar for that liability. 
Additionally, KBC's argument misconstrues both claim preclusion and the rules of civil 
procedure specifically designed to permit parties to litigate remedies, like indemnity, which are 
predicated upon a finding ofliability. 
Claim preclusion applies when a party had the "opportunity" or "capacity" to assert a 
claim, and failed to do so. See, e.g., Burns v. Baldwin, supra, 138 Idaho at 485, 65 P.3d at 507 
(res judicata applied where plaintiff had "the opportunity" to litigate its claim for additional 
interest in California courts); City of Caldwell v. Roark, 98 Idaho 897, 899-900, 575 P.2d 495, 
497-498 (1978) (where landowners "had an opportunity" in condemnation proceedings to 
challenge the necessity of a taking, and chose only to contest the amount of just compensation, 
the former matters "are now res judicata"). Accord U.S. Industries v. Blake Construction Co., 
Inc., 765 F.2d 195, 204 (C.A.D.C., 1985) (res judicata did not require plaintiff to actually to 
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have been heard on attorneys' fees claim where party "enjoyed an opportunity" to adduce 
evidence on its claims during the prior jury trial). 
KEC had ample opportunity to assert and litigate its alleged right to statutory indemnity 
prior to the jury verdict. It could have asserted indemnity in its cross-claim, included its 
statutory indenmity right in its motion for summary judgment, or responded in the affirmative 
when Judge Whaley asked about indenmity at the end of the jury charge conference. It did not 
avail itself of any of those opportunities. 
Further, the "prematurity" exception to res judicata applies only when: 1) the final 
judgment "rests on the prematurity of the action" (Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 20(2)); 
or 2) the "facts occurred subsequent to the first trial that triggered the filing of the second suit" 
(Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 754, 663 P.2d 287, 290 (1983); accord Rose v. 
Town of Harwich, 778 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1985)). Neither applies here. 
First, Judge Whaley denied KEC's post-trial motion for indemnity because it was "too 
late," not because it was "premature." See R., Vol. II, p. 379. Denial of a remedy, damage, or 
theory of recovery on the grounds that it is asserted "too late" in a proceeding does not create an 
exception to claim preclusion. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 25, Comment b 
(emphasis added) (for purposes of claim preclusion "[i]t is immaterial that the plaintiff in the 
first action sought to prove the acts relied on in the second action and was not permitted to do so 
because they were not alleged in the complaint and an application to amend the complaint came 
too late"). Accord Huck on Behalf of Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45,. 50 (3rd Cir. 
1997) (trial court's decision to deny a motion to amend a pleading "does not change" the 
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outcome of claim preclusion analysis); Poe v. John Deere Co., 695 F.2d 1103, 1107 (8th Cir. 
1982) (finding "no merit" to plaintiffs argument that a theory was "unavailable" to her in prior 
federal action; a plaintiff "has only himself to blame" for not bringing additional theories or 
remedies "to the court's attention and amending his complaint accordingly"). 
This Court's decisions agree. See, e.g., Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 
804 P.2d 319, 324-325 (1990) (parties could not "circumvent" resjudicata by failing to pursue a 
remedy in a timely fashion and then claiming in a later action that the remedy was "unavailable" 
in the first action): 
Having chosen the Oregon forum, Diamond was required to file all claims 
stemming from the transaction in the Oregon federal court, even though the 
slander portion of the claim was untimely because of a failure to file within the 
statute of limitations. 
Second, the adjudication of KEC's reckless misconduct is not a "fact" that "occurred" 
subsequent to the first trial; it was the jury's resolution of facts that occurred in 1998. Nothing 
prevented KEC from asserting indemnity rights and remedies against Lamar arising out of 
Kuntz's 1998 injuries and resulting claims against KEC, in addition to all other remedies 
available to it under § 2404(2). The very "permissive cross-claim" rule invoked by KEC to 
assert its cross-claim in the Kuntz action, expressly allows a cross-claimant to litigate its claim 
that another defendant "is or may be" liable to the cross-claimant for "all or part" of a claim 
asserted by the plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 13(g) (Apx. at A-10). Having litigated Lamar's 
liability for violations of Idaho's I-IV A through a motion for summary judgment, there is no 
reason that KEC could not have litigated Lamar's liability for any judgment entered against KEC 
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at the same time. To the contrary, KEC's own counsel conceded during post-trial arguments in 
the Kuntz action that indenmity under § 2404(2) "would have been a question for the Court" 
because resolution of the claim would be based on "a pure interpretation of statute." (Old R., 
Vol. II, p. 476). 
For that same reason, KEC's conclusory statement that it could have "pied" indenmity 
against Lamar in the Kuntz action, but could not have "litigated" indenmity (Appt.'s Br., p. 30), 
is without merit. Both Judges Whaley and Luster properly rejected the concept that rules of civil 
procedure permit parties to plead claims that they cannot litigate. See Old R., Vol. II, p. 474 
("[i]f [indenmity] had been [pied], ... it could have been tried to the jury after their verdict; or 
could have been tried, if the jury was waived, to the court, or could have theoretically gone to the 
jury with the plaintiffs' claim"); Old R., Vol. II, p. 531 ("KEC had an opportunity to institute a 
Cross-Claim against Lamar and, in fact, a Cross-Claim was filed .... Therefore, it can be inferred 
from the undisputed facts that KEC had notice of its potential liability and an opportunity to 
make a claim for indemnity against Lamar"). 
2. The "permissive cross-claim" cases cited by KEC hold that 
claim preclusion applies when, as here, a cross-claim asserted a 
substantive claim against a co-defendant. 
The bulk of KEC's brief argues that this Court should establish, as a rule of Idaho law, 
that res judicata does not attach to the litigation of "permissive" cross-claims. (Appt.'s Br., pp. 
25-44). Two facts, however, take this case out of the realm of the "pennissive cross-claim" 
cases urged by KEC. First, because KEC asserted a substantive cross-claim against Lamar in the 
Kuntz action, the two were squarely adversarial throughout the trial and the "rule" advanced 
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would not apply. Second, after judgment was entered on the apportioned verdict, KEC pursued 
an "indemnity" cross-claim in the federal action and failed to appeal the federal court's 
conclusion that the cross-claim was waived. 
KEC concedes that the res judicata exception it urges should apply only if the facts 
demonstrate a lack of adversity between defendants in the prior action - as when no 
"substantive" cross-claim was alleged in the prior action. Appt.'s Br., p. 43, quoting Paramount 
Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 146, n. 11 (3rd Cir. 1999) and citing Rainbow 
Management Group, Ltd., v. Atlantis Submarines Hawaii, L.P., 158 F.R.D. 656, 660 (D. Haw. 
1994) (res judicata does apply when the cross-claim in the prior action "includes a substantive 
claim (as opposed to merely a claim for contribution and indemnity")). 
"Adversity" is a fact-specific determination. See Puckett v. City of Emmett, supra, 113 
Idaho at 50, 747 P.2d at 641 (under the facts presented, the position of the defendant-cross-
claimant "evolved into one more similar to that of a plaintiff than a cross-claiming co-
defendant"). A cross-claim is substantive when it "has certain characteristics of an independent 
claim .... " 3 Moore's Federal Practice, ,i 13.34, p. 13-209. Here, KEC and Lamar were clearly 
"adverse" in the Kuntz action, and KEC's cross-claim had numerous "indicia" of an independent 
claim. KEC asserted that Lamar violated a statutory duty owed to KEC under Idaho's HVA, 
obtained judgment as a matter of Jaw against Lamar on that independent claim, and attempted to 
prove that Lamar's breach of the HV A was the largest contributor to Kuntz' s damages. That 
substantive claim was not "contingent upon the outcome ofplaintiffKuntz's claims against both 
RESPONDENT'S OPPOSING BRIEF AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL- 35 
Lamar and KBC" (Appt.'s Br., p. 43), as evidenced by the fact that KBC received summary 
judgment on Lamar's liability under the HV A. 
Adversity distinguishes this case from cases cited by KBC in which no cross-claims were 
asserted in the prior action (e.g., Israel v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass 'n of Iowa, 339 N.W.2d 143, 146 
(Iowa 1983) (Appt.'s Br., pp. 31, 33)) or where the defendant bringing the later action did not 
assert a cross-claim in the prior action (e.g., Hemme v. Bharti, 183 S.W.3d 593 (Mo. 2006) 
(Appt.'s Br., pp. 34-44)) or the cross-claim in the prior action only asserted derivative claims 
(e.g., Krikava v. Webber, 716 P.2d 916 (Wash. App. 1986) (Appt.'s Br., pp. 35, 41, 42)) or cases 
where the later suit asserted a different cause of action and/or transaction (e.g., Beck v. Westphal, 
366 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Mich. App. 1984) (Appt.'s Br., p. 30); Sid Richardson Carbon & 
Gasoline Co. v. lnterenergy Res., Ltd., 99 F.3d 746, 756 (5th Cir. 1996) (Appt.'s Br., p. 30)). 
The Krikava v. Webber case (discussed at pages 41-42 ofKBC's Briel) shows how KBC 
is trying to fit a round peg into a square hole. As KBC explains, the underlying actions in 
Krikava arose out of an automobile accident. Two passengers filed separate suits against 
K.rikava, the other driver, and the other driver's employer, and Krikava filed a derivative cross-
claim for contribution and indemnity against her co-defendants. The cases were then 
consolidated, settled and dismissed; Krikava never pursued or litigated her cross-claims. 
Krikava then filed suit for her own injuries against her former co-defendants. In 
analyzing whether the mere filing of a derivative cross-claim created sufficient adversity to 
preclude Krikava's later suit, the court was careful to distinguish derivative, unlitigated cross-
claims from the kind of substantive cross-claim pied and litigated in this case. See, e.g., 716 
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P.2d at 919 (a cross-claim as to which "co-parties are adversaries" is subject to claim 
preclusion). Krikava also notes that even if co-parties are not adversaries, they will be estopped 
from relitigating issues that are actually litigated in the prior suit: 
For example, had the prior consolidated actions been litigated and had Krikava 
been found negligent and the City not negligent, that judgment would be 
preclusive as to that issue in the present suit. ... Because that issue would be 
determinative of her claim, Krikava would be barred effectively from asserting it 
now. 
(Emphasis in original). Here, KEC and Lamar were not only "adversaries," but they also 
litigated the "issue" of whether KEC could invoke § 2404(2) to reallocate its apportioned 
judgment to Lamar in post-trial proceedings. 
Finally, even if this Court were to examine the academic issues relating to non-
adversarial, derivative cross-claims presented in KEC's brief, it should not reach the conclusion 
proposed by KEC. KEC argues that courts are "split" on the question; federal courts, however, 
fall on the side of res judicata as to that split. See Ocean Drilling & Exploration Company, Inc. 
v. Mont Boat Rental Services, Inc., 799 F.2d 213,217 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Because ODECO's cause 
of action for tort indemnity is based on substantially the same facts as its claim for contractual 
indemnity, res judicata bars the belated assertion"); Rooney v. United States, 694 F.2d 582, 584 
(9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff could not avoid res judicata by changing the nomenclature of his claim 
from "equitable apportiomnent" of attorneys' fees in the first action, to "reimbursement" of 
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attorney fees in the second action): Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. 
Co., Ltd., 750 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1984) (applying Pennsylvania law). 10 
F. Policy Concerns Support Affirmance of the Trial Court's Dismissal of 
KEC's State Court Complaint. 
The parade of horribles KEC invokes should this Court make "unasserted cross-claims ... 
compulsory" (Appt.'s Br., p. 33), has no relevance to the facts of this case. KEC did assert a 
cross-claim based on Lamar's violation ofidaho's HVA in the Kuntz action, and the parties were 
squarely adverse in the litigation of that claim. 
Nor does KEC's invocation of the legislative history of Idaho's HVA and "the public 
policy of safety" (Appellant's Br., pp. 44-50) justify creating a "cross-claim exception" to res 
judicata. KEC's exception would not promote safety - it would eliminate power companies' 
incentive to construct and maintain their lines with the highest degree of care. Conversely, 
KEC' s exception violates all tlu·ee fundamental public policies supporting res judicata - to 
protect parties "from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserve[] judicial 
resources, and foster[] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent 
decisions." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1979). Accord Aldape v. Akins, 
105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (1983). See also 18 Wright-Miller-Cooper, Fed. Prac. & 
10 KEC attempts to distinguish Charter Oak on the grounds that "precisely the same claim had 
been litigated to conclusion in the prior state court action." (Appt.'s Br., p. 38). That distinction 
is premised upon KEC's assumption that a derivative cross-claim for tort indemnity is "precisely 
the same" as a cause of action for breach of a contract with an indemnity provision. That is not 
true - one cause of action sounds in contract, the other in tort - and that was not the basis of the 
Third Circuit's decision. The Third Circuit held that because the same "liability creating 
conduct" was at issue in both cases, the second case was barred. Id. at 270. 
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Proc., § 4403 ("Plaintiffs and defendants alike may properly demand that the expensive and 
harrowing ordeal of litigation be approached seriously so that it may yield a final result that not 
only precludes a second ordeal but also achieves the independent values of repose"). 
If this Court were to accept KEC's argument that indemnity can be "pled" but cannot be 
"litigated" in the action determining liability and damages (Appt.'s Br., p. 30), Idaho courts 
would be forced to try two actions arising out of a single transaction - one to determine liability 
and a second, subsequent trial to determine indemnity rights. KEC's argument also imposes 
"inconsistent results" that would erode public confidence in the judicial system. A federal jury 
heard all of the evidence relating to Kuntz's injuries from his 1998 contact with a high voltage 
wire and determined that KEC's reckless misconduct was a 50% causal factor of those injuries. 
Now KBC seeks the judgment that it is responsible for 0% of Kuntz's injuries and that Lamar, 
instead of the 38% which was litigated to final judgment and satisfied, is responsible for 88%. 
Carving out any exception to res judicata is itself contrary to "[ o ]ne of the oldest and 
most universally accepted" public policies - "finality." Willis v. Willis, 93 Idaho 261, 264, 460 
P.2d 396, 399 (1969). Accord Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 
(1984) (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to carve out a "public policy" exception to res judicata for 
actions brought under federal civil rights statutes); Hindmarsh v. Mock, 139 Idaho 92, 93-95, 57 
P.3d 803, 804-806 (2002) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that "the policy of finality advanced by 
res judicata should yield when its application would frustrate another social policy"). Even less 
persuasive is KEC's attempt to establish a res judicata exception that is based on a tortured 
reading of a federal rule of procedure (Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 13(g)), and created for the sole purpose 
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of allowing the utility to escape the consequences of its own trial strategy. See Federated 
Department Stores, supra, 452 U.S. at 401 (citation omitted): 
"The predicament in which respondent finds himself is of his own making .... 
[W]e cannot be expected, for his sole relief, to upset the general and well-
established doctrine of res judicata, conceived in the light of the maxim that the 
interest of the state requires that there be an end of litigation - a maxim which 
comports with common sense as well as public policy .... " 
* * * 
"Simple justice" is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a 
period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves vital 
public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of the 
equities in a particular case. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided KBC the means of asserting and litigating its 
claim against Lamar and Kuntz in the Kuntz action, and it did assert and litigate that claim. KBC 
simply elected not to pursue a portion of the statutory remedy for that claim until after the jury 
(per KBC's own request) apportioned fault for Kuntz's damages, and elected not to appeal the 
federal judge's denial of its belated and inconsistent request for additional indemnity damages. 
For all of the reasons stated more fully .above, the Trial Court properly dismissed KBC's action 
on res judicata grounds and this Court should affirm. 
V. ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
The facts of this case render it unnecessary for this Court to engage in first impression 
statutory interpretation of Idaho's HVA, because well-established principles of res judicata bar 
KBC's lawsuit at the outset. However, should this Court disagree with Judge Luster's 
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application of res judicata, numerous other legal reasons exist to affirm the dismissal of KEC's 
action that seeks to reallocate a final, apportioned judgment entered in a prior action." 
A. A Utility's Action Under Idaho's HV A Is the Same as Any Other 
Statutory Tort Action, . and Is Subject to Idaho's Comparative 
Negligence and Contribution Statutes, J.C.§§ 6-801, 6-803. 
KEC's brief repeatedly argues that basic tort principles apply to both the cross-claim it 
asserted in the Kuntz action, and the Complaint it filed in state court. See, e.g., Appt.'s Br., pp. 9, 
16, 28, 30-31, citing to Judge Luster's analogy between a utility's remedy under LC. § 55-
2404(2) to a common Jaw tort indemnity claim. Similarly, KEC repeatedly analogizes its cross-
claim in the Kuntz action to an apportionment of damages under tort Jaw. See, e.g., Appt.'s Br., 
pp. 43-44 arguing that KEC's federal cross-claim against Lamar was "not a substantive claim," 
or a claim "for its own damages against Lamar," but rather "a claim contingent upon the 
outcome of plaintiff Kuntz's claims against both Lamar and KEC." Accepting KEC's own 
argument that causes of action under Idaho's HV A are governed by tort principles, then Idaho's 
Comparative Negligence and Contribution statutes (Apx. at A-6 - A-8) should also govern that 
cause of action. See, e.g., Gooding Cty. v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201,204, 46 P.3d 18, 21 (2002) 
11 Although Lamar filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal in this action, the issues presented herein are 
more properly categorized under this Court's "right result, wrong reason" jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., G&H Land & Cattle Co. v. Heitzman & Nelson, Inc., 102 Idaho 204, 207, 628 P.2d 1038, 
1041 (1981) ("the case Jaw is replete with decisions holding that if a decision of a lower court is 
correct, but is founded on an incorrect theory, it will be affirmed on appeal upon the correct 
theory"); Revello v. Revello, 100 Idaho 829, 832, 606 P.2d 933, 936 (1980) ("this court has 
consistently held that ' [ w ]here the order of the lower court is correct but entered on a different 
theory, it will be affirmed on the correct theory'") ( citations omitted). 
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(statutes that are in pari materia must be construed together); Watson v. Navistar Intern. Transp. 
Corp., 121 Idaho 643,659,827 P.2d 656,672 (1992), n.10 (citation omitted): 
[W]e have held that "[T]he scope of LC. § 6-801 is broad. It is not limited to 
certain types of actions; it is not limited by exceptions. Rather, it covers any 
action in which the plaintiff is seeking to recover on grounds of negligence." 
Other jurisdictions with statutes virtually identical to Idaho's HVA have applied comparative 
fault principles when, as here, the injured "third person" is also a contractor. See, e.g., Gunnell v. 
Arizona Public Service Co., 46 P.3d 399 (Ariz. 2002) (applying comparative fault when both the 
utility and excavator were at fault for cutting underground cable). At a minimum, nothing in 
§ 2404(2) and no public policy precludes a utility from requesting that damages be apportioned. 
That is what KEC did here. Having requested application of Idaho's allocated fault scheme, 
KEC should be bound by its requirements. 
The Idaho Contribution statute, § 6-803(1) states that a right to contribution arises when 
a joint tortfeasor "has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro 
rata share thereof." (Apx. at A-8). Here, KBC did not discharge a common liability - Lamar 
satisfied the judgment entered against it (Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., supra, 385 F.3d at 1181, n.5); 
nor did KBC pay more than its "pro rata share" - it paid precisely the share of fault allocated to 
it by the jury. If KBC were successful in this action in obtaining reimbursement from Lamar on 
its "indemnity" claim under LC. § 55-2404(2), it would lead to an incongruous result. Lamar 
would then have paid more than its "pro rata share" of the Kuntz federal judgment, and would be 
entitled to contribution from KBC in yet a third action under LC. § 6-803(1 ). 
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As the facts of this case amply demonstrate, the application of the comparative fanlt and 
contribution statutes to actions brought under Idaho's HV A does no violence to Idaho law. 
However, to allow KEC reimbursement under LC. § 55-2404(2) after having been found to be 
50% of the cause of the damage, would require this court to conclude that the Idaho legislature 
intended to impliedly repeal the application of the Comparative Negligence statute, LC. § 6-801 
and the Contribution statute, LC. § 6-803(1) to statutory tort actions under the HV A. Implied 
repeal of legislation is strongly disfavored and every effort is made to construe statutes in pari 
materia to give them all meaning. Gooding Cty. v. Wybenga, supra, 137 Idaho at 204, 46 P.3d at 
21; Watson v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., supra, 121 Idaho at 659,827 P.2d at 672, n.10. It 
does no violence to the policy of the HV A to hold a utility responsible for its own "reckless" 
conduct. But it certainly does violence to the Comparative Negligence and the Contribution 
statutes to allow KEC to obtain "indemnity" from Lamar under the facts of this case. 
KEC's claim against Lamar, while couched in the language of"indemnity," is a statutory 
tort claim authorized by LC. § 55-2404(2) ("the contractor committing the violation shall be 
liable to the public utility ... for all damages to the facilities and all costs and expenses, including 
damages to third persons, incurred by the public utility") (Apx. at A-4). Like any other statutory 
or common law tort it is subject to both the Idaho Comparative Negligence scheme, LC. § 6-801, 
and the Contribution between Joint Tortfeasors scheme of LC. § 6-803(1). KEC's attempt to 
reallocate the federal court judgment should be rejected. 
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B. In the Alternative, KEC's "Claim" for Indemnity Under I.C. § 55-
2404(2) Is Barred by the Applicable Statute of Limitations. 
In his decision dismissing KEC's action as res judicata, Judge Luster rejected Lamar's 
alternative argument that KEC's claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations 
applicable to liabilities arising from statute (I.C. § 5-218, Apx. at A-9). See Tr. Op., pp. 12-13: 
The statute of limitations accrued on a cause of action under Idaho Code § 55-
2404(2) when the judgment was entered against KBC on October 29, 2002. The 
filing of the Complaint by KEC on December 30, 2002, was with the three (3) 
year time period set forth in Idaho Code§ 5-218, which is the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
Should this Court affirm Judge Luster's res judicata dismissal, it is unnecessary for it to address 
the appropriate accrual of a claim for "costs and expenses ... incurred" under I.C. § 55-2404(2). 
If this Court should find that Judge Luster erred, however, then it should also conclude that 
KEC's complaint is time-barred. 
The sole basis of Judge Luster's ruling on the statute of limitations is his reliance on the 
"general common law rule" in inde1m1ity cases that "the cause of action does not accrue until 
damages have been awarded against the party seeking indemnification." (Tr. Op., p. 11). 
However, the cause of action authorized by § 55-2404(2) is a statutory tort, not common law 
indemnity. The statute provides: 
If a violation of the provisions of this chapter results in physical or electrical 
contact with any high voltage overhead line, the contractor committing the 
violation shall be liable to the public utility owning or operating the high voltage 
overhead line for all damages to the facilities and all costs and expenses, 
including damages to third persons, incurred by the public utility as a result of 
the contact. 
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(Emphasis added). One form of incurred costs and expenses a utility may obtain is "damages to 
third persons'' for which the utility is held to be liable. But that is not the only incurred cost and 
expense available, and incurred costs and expenses are not the only "damage" available. 
An example of another incurred cost or expense would be attorneys' fees a utility is 
obligated to pay to investigate a contact with a high voltage line and to defend and prosecute any 
action brought arising under Idaho's HV A or any other statute or common law. KEC demanded 
such attorneys' fees in its answer and cross-claim filed in the federal Kuntz action '(R., Vol. II, p. 
331) and in its original state court complaint. (Old R., Vol. I, p. 6). 
Discovery conducted in this state court action established that: 
• KEC first retained counsel to investigate Kuntz's contact with an overhead 
line in January, 1999; 
• Legal services were rendered from May 9, 1999 through June 29, 1999; 
and 
• KEC first paid for services rendered on July 14, 1999. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 239, 265, ,r 6; and Exh. E (p. 285) at 293, 301-323). Because it was undisputed 
that KEC "incurred" and "paid" costs and expenses no later than June of 1999, and did not file 
its action for reimbursement/1ndemnity of those costs and expenses until December 30, 2002, 
more than three years later, Lamar filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
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KEC's complaint" was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for liability arising under a 
statute. (R., Vol. 2, p. 237). 
After Lamar filed its motion, KEC withdrew its claim for expenses and attorneys' fees 
(R., Vol. 4, pp. 729, 741) and filed an "amended amended" Complaint deleting the claim (id, p. 
759). No rule or legal doctrine, however, allows a party to evade the statute of limitations by 
disclaiming and waiving damages that would otherwise cause the running of the statute to 
commence. 
A cause of action accrues at the time of the act or occurrence complained of, but no later 
than when "some damage" occurs. Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 
144, 150, 90 P.3d 894, 900 (2004). Here, "some damage" occurred no later than KEC's payment 
of the first attorney fee bill. Under well-established Idaho law, the fact that KEC might incur 
additional damages - i.e., additional attorneys' fees and/or damages to third parties - did not toll 
the running of the statute of limitations. (ld. at 245-246, citing Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 
Idaho 225,227,560 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1977) (a cause of action accrues "albeit the full extent of 
the damages may be unknown or unpredictable at that initial time")). As the Court held in 
Ralphs: 
12 As indicated in Lamar's Opposing Brief, KEC incorrectly construes the damages provision of 
Idaho's HVA as a separate cause of action. However, for purposes of its cross-appeal, Lamar 
will assume that this Court has accepted KEC's arguments. 
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The fact that plaintiff Ralphs became at a later time aware of additional injuries or 
damages is not sufficient to excuse his earlier knowledge of the alleged wrongful 
act of the physical assault upon him caused by the then existing and negligence of 
Newton and the city of Spirit Lake. 
98 Idaho at 227, 560 P.2d at 1317. 
In this case, certainly by the time KEC paid its first attorney fee bill arising out of 
Kuntz's contact with a high voltage wire (July 14, 1999), it was aware of Kuntz's accident, 
aware that Kuntz and Lamar had allegedly been negligent in not providing notice that Kuntz was 
working within ten feet of a high voltage wire, and aware that it had incurred costs and damages 
as a result. The fact that KEC may have incurred additional, clearly foreseeable damages later -
i.e., the jury's allocation of 50% fault for Kuntz's injuries to KEC - does not suspend the statute 
of limitations. KEC cannot, by virtue of simply dismissing its earlier incurred costs and 
expenses, thereby give new life to a claim that was time barred. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated more fully above, this Court should conclude that KEC's 
action was properly dismissed on the grounds of res judicata. It can also sustain the dismissal 
under Idaho's comparative negligence or contribution statutes and/or the expiration of the 
applicable statute oflimitations. 
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IDAHO CODE 
TITLE 55. PROPERTY IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 24. ACTIVITIES IN PROXIMITY TO HIGH VOLTAGE OVERHEAD LINES 
Copyright © 1948-1992 by The Michie Company. All rights reserved 
55-2401 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(!) "Authorized person" means: 
(a) An employee of a public utility which produces, transmits or delivers electricity, while the employee is 
working within the scope of his employment; 
(h) An employee of a public utility which provides and whose work relates to communication services or an em-
ployee of a siate, county or municipal agency which has authorized circuit construction on or near the poles or 
structures of a public utility, while the employee is working within the scope of his employment; 
( c) An employee of an industrial plant whose work relates to the electrical system of the industrial plant, while 
the employee is working within the scope of his employment; 
( d) An employee of a cable television or communication services company or an employee of a contractor of a 
cable television or communication services company, if specifically authorized by the owner of the poles to 
make cable television or communication services attachments, while the employee is working within the scope 
of his employment; or 
(e) An employee or agent of a state, county or municipal agency which has or whose work relates to overhead 
electrical lines or circuit construction or conductors on poles or structures of any type, while the employee is 
working within the scope of his employment. 
(2) "Contractor" means any sole proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, corporation, or other business entity 
qualified to _do business in the state of Idaho which contracts to perform any function or activity upon any land, 
building, highway, waterway or other premises. 
(3) "High voltage" means voltage in excess of six hundred (600) volts measured between conductors or between 
a conductor and the ground. 
(4) "Overhead line" means all electrical conductors installed above ground. 
(5) "Person" means any individual or natural person. 
(6) "Public utility" means any publicly, cooperatively or privately owned utility which owns or operates a high 
voltage overhead line. 
[LC.,§ 55-2401, as added by 1992, ch. 177, § I, p. 559.J 
I. C. § 55-2401 
ID ST 55-2401 
A-1 
55-2402 Activity near overhead line -- Safety restrictions. 
Unless danger against contact with high voltage overhead lines has been effectively guarded against as provided 
in section 55-2403, Idaho Code, a contractor, individually or through an agent or employee or as an agent or em-
ployee, shall not: 
(I) Perform or require any other person to perform _any function or activity upon any land, building, highway, 
waterway or other premises if at any time during the performance of such function or activity it is possible that 
the contractor or the person or any part of any tool or material used by the contractor or the person could move 
or be placed or brought closer to any high voltage overhead line than the following clearances: 
(a) For lines nominally rated at fifty (50) kilovolts or less, ten (10) feet of clearance; 
(b) For lines nominally rated at over fifty (50) kilovolts, ten (IO) feet plus four-tenths (.4) of an inch for each 
kilovolt over fifty (50) kilovolts. 
(2) Operate any mechanical or hoisting equipment or any load of such equipment, any part of which is capable 
of vertical, lateral or swinging motion closer to any high voltage overhead lines than the clearances specified in 
subsections (])(a) and (b) of this section. 
[J.C.,§ 55-2402, as added by 1992, ch. 177, § !, p. 559.] 
I. C. § 55-2402 
ID ST 55-2402 
A-2 
55-2403 Activity in close proximity to lines -- Clearance arrangements with public utility -- Payment. 
(1) If any contractor desires to temporarily carry on any function, activity, work or operation in closer prox-
imity to any high voltage overhead line than permitted in this chapter, or in such proximity that the function, 
activity, work or operation could possibly come within closer proximity than permitted in this chapter, the con-
tractor responsible for performing the work shall promptly notify the public utility owning or operating the high 
voltage overhead line. The contractor may perform the work only after making mutually agreeable arrangements 
with the public utility owning or operating the line, including coordination of work and construction schedules. 
Arrangements may include placement of temporary mechanical barriers to separate and prevent contact between 
material, equipment or persons and the high voltage overhead lines, temporary deenergization and grounding, or 
temporary relocation or raising of the high voltage overhead lines. A written agreement identifying the arrange-
ments and the payment to be made therefor as provided in subsection (2) of this section shall be executed by the 
parties. 
(2) The public utility may, in conformance with its then current practice, require the contractor responsible for 
perfonning the work in the vicinity of the high voltage overhead lines to pay any actual expenses of the public 
utility in providing arrangements for clearances. The public utility is not required to provide the arrangements 
for clearances until a written agreement for payment has been made. The public utility may require payment in 
advance. Any surplus amounts paid to the utility shall be refunded. 
(3) The public utility shall make arrangements for clearances in accordance with the agreement of the parties. 
Where a date certain for completion of the clearance arrangements is not othe1wise specified in the agreement, 
the a1rangements must be completed within a reasonable time. 
(4) The public utility may deny any request for clearances which in the judgment of the utility may jeopardize 
the performance, integrity, reliability or stability of the utility's electrical system or any electrical system with 
which it is interconnected. 
[J.C.,§ 55-2403, as added by 1992, ch. 177, § 1, p. 559.] 
I. C. § 55-2403 
ID ST 55-2403 
A-3 
55-2404 Violations, 
(1) Any contractor or agent thereof violating the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to a civil penalty 
of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) to be imposed by the court in favor of the state and deposited in the 
state general account. 
(2) If a violation of the provisions of this chapter results in physical or electrical contact with any high voltage 
overhead line, the contractor committing the violation shall be liable to the public utility owning or operating the 
high voltage overhead line for all damages to the facilities and all costs and expenses, including damages to 
third persons, incurred by the public utility as a result of the contact. 
(3) County prosecuting attorneys and the attorney general are authorized to prosecute violations of the provi-
sions of this chapter. 
[J.C.,§ 55-2404, as added by 1992, ch. 177, § 1, p. 559.] 
L C. § 55-2404 
ID ST 55-2404 
A-4 
55-2405 Exemptions. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to: 
(1) Construction, reconstruction, operation or maintenance by an authorized person of overhead electrical or 
communication circuits or conductors and their supporting structures1 or to electrical generating, transmission or 
distribution systems, or to communication systems; 
(2) Agreements between public age1wies to perform any work or undertaking which each public agency entering 
into tbe agreement is authorized by law to perform, provided that any such agreement shall be authorized by the 
governing body of each party to the agreement; or 
(3) Fire, police or other emergency service workers while engaged in emergency operations, or highway districts 
or other governmental entities performing routine or emergency maintenance in their rights of way. 
[LC.,§ 55-2405, as added by 1992, ch. 177, § l, p. 559.J 
I. C. § 55-2405 
ID ST 55-2405 
A-5 
West!aw. 
ID ST§ 6-801 
J.C. § 6-801 
C 
West's Idaho Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 6. Actions in Particular Cases 
" Chapter 8. Actions for Negligence 
Page 1 
... § 6-801. Comparative negligence or comparative responsibility--Effect of contributo1y negligence 
Contributory negligence or comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his 
legal representative to recover damages for negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility resulting 
in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence or comparative responsibility was not as great as 
the negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility of the person against whom recovery is sought, 
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence or comparative re-
sponsibility attributable to the person recovering. Nothing contained herein shall create any new legal theory, 
cause of action, or legal defense. 
S.L. 1971, ch. 186, § 1; S.L. 1987, ch. 278, § 2. 
J.C. § 6-801, ID ST§ 6-801 
Current through the 2007 First Regular Session of the 59th Legislature, 
Chs. 1 to 369 
Copr. © 2007 Thomson/West. 
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ID ST§ 6-802 
LC. § 6-802 
C 
West's Idaho Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 6. Actions in Particular Cases 
'• Chapter 8. Actions for Negligence 
Page 1 
~ § 6-802. Verdict giving percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to 
each party 
The court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determin-
ing the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to each 
party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of negligence or 
comparative responsibility attributable to the person recovering. Nothing contained herein shall create any new 
legal theory, cause of action, or legal defense. 
S.L. 1971, ch. 186, § 2; S.L. 1987, ch. 278, § 3. 
LC. § 6-802, ID ST§ 6-802 
Current through the 2007 First Regular Session of the 59th Legislature, 
Chs. 1 to 369 
Copr. © 2007 Thomson/West. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
A-7 
West!aw. 
ID ST§ 6-803 
I.C. § 6-803 
C 
West's Idaho Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 6. Actions in Particular Cases 
"' Chapter 8. Actions for Negligence 
Page 1 
.. § 6-803. Contribution among joint tortfeasors--Declaratiou of right-- Exceptiou--Limited ,ioiut 
aud several liability 
(I) The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors, but a joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judg-
ment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata 
share thereof. 
(2) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution 
from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement. 
(3) The common law doctrine of joint and several liability is hereby limited to causes of action listed in subsec-
tion (5) of this section. In any action in which the trier of fact attributes the percentage of negligence or compar-
ative responsibility to persons listed on a special verdict, the court shall enter a separate judgment against each 
party whose negligence or comparative responsibility exceeds the negligence or comparative responsibility at-
tributed to the person recovering. The negligence or comparative responsibility of each such party is to be com-
pared individually to the negligence or comparative responsibility of the person recovering. Judgment against 
each such party shall be entered in an amount equal to each party's proportionate share of the total damages 
awarded. 
(4) As used herein, "joint tortfeasor" means one (I) of two (2) or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort 
for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of 
them. 
(5) A party shall be jointly and severally liable for the fault of another person or entity or for payment of the 
proportionate share of another party where they were acting in concert or when a person was acting as an agent 
or servant of another party. As used in this section, 11 acting in concertn means pursuing a common plan or design 
which results in the commission of an intentional or reckless tortious act. 
S.L. 1971, ch. 186, § 3; S.L. 1987, ch. 278, § 4; S.L. 1990, ch. 120, § I; S.L. 2003, ch. 122, § l. 
HISTORJCAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
S.L. 2003, ch. 122, § 6, provides: 
"This act shall be in full force and effect on and after July I, 2003. Sections 1 through 3 of this act shall apply to 
all causes of action which accrue thereafter. Section 4 of this act shall apply to all cases in which an appeal is 
filed thereafter." 
I.C. § 6-803, ID ST § 6-803 
Current tlu·ough the 2007 First Regular Session of the 59th Legislature, 
Chs. 1 to 369 
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ID ST§ 5-218 
LC.§ 5-218 
C 
West's Idaho Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 5. Proceedings in Civil Actions in Courts of Record 
" Chapter 2. Limitation of Actions 
~ § 5-218. Statutory liabilities, trespass, trover, replevin, and fraud 
Within three (3) years: 
Page I 
I. An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture. The cause of action in favor of 
the state ofldaho or any political subdivision thereof, upon a surety bond or undertaking provided for or re-
quired by statute shall not be deemed to have accrued against any surety on such bond or unde1taking until the 
discovery by the state of Idaho or any political subdivision thereof of the facts constituting the liability. 
2. An action for trespass upon real property. 
3. An action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of 
personal property. 
4. An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in such case not to be deemed to 
have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
S.L. 1974, ch. 41, § 2. 
Codifications: C.C.P. 1881, § 158; R.S. 1887, R.C. 1909, and C.L. 1919, § 4054; C.S. 1919, § 6611; LC.A.,§ 
5-218. 
LC.§ 5-218, ID ST§ 5-218 
Current through the 2007 First Regular Session of the 59th Legislature, 
Chs. 1 to 369 
Copr. © 2007 Thomson/West. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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C 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (Refs & Annas) 
" Title Ill. Pleadings and Motions 
* Rule 13. Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
(a) Compulsory Counterclaim. 
(1) In General. A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that--at the time of its service--the plead-
er has against an opposing party if the claim: 
(A) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; and 
(B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
(2) Exceptions. The pleader need not state the claim if: 
(A) when the action was commenced, the claim was the subject of another pending action; or 
(B) the opposing party sued on its claim by attachment or other process that did not establish personal juris-
diction over the pleader on that claim, and the pleader does not assert any counterclaim under this rule. 
(b) Permissive Counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim against an opposing party any claim that 
is not compulsory. 
(c) Relief Sought in a Counterclaim. A counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the recove1y sought by the 
opposing pa1iy. It may request relief that exceeds in amount or differs in kind from the relief sought by the op-
posing patty. 
(d) Counterclaim Against the United States. These rules do not expand the right to assert a counterclaim--or 
to claim a credit--against the United States or a United States officer or agency. 
{e) Counterclaim Maturing or Acquired After Pleading. The court may permit a party to file a supplemental 
pleading asserting a counterclaim that matured or was acquired by the party after serving an earlier pleading. 
(I) Omitted Com1terclaim. The court may pennit a party to amend a pleading to add a counterclaim if it was 
omitted through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect or if justice so requires. 
(g) Crossclaim Against a Coparty. A pleading may state as a crossclaim any claim by one party against a co-
party if the claim arises out of the transaction or occun-ence that is the subject matter of the original action or of 
a counterclaim, or if the claim relates to any property that is the subject matter of the original action. The 
crossclaim may include a claim that the coparty is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim 
asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(h) Joining Additional Parties. Rules 19 and 20 govern the addition of a person as a party to a counterclaim or 
A-10 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 13 Page2 
crossclaim. 
(i) Separate Trials; Separate Judgments. If the court orders separate trials under Rule 42(b), it may enter 
judgment on a counterclaim or crossclaim under Rule 54(b) when it has jurisdiction to do so, even if the oppos-
ing party's claims have been dismissed or otherwise resolved. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Amended December 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948; January 21, 1963, effective July 1, 1963; February 28, 
1966, effective July !, 1966; March 2, 1987, effective August !, 1987; April 30, 2007, effective December 1, 
2007.) 
Amendments received to 08-01-07 
Copr. (C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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